Cold War Ethos, alive and well during 2008 presidential election.

Crossposted from Care2.com’s Political Causes Blog ~ Originally published 16 February 2010

Former Congressman Charles Wilson, the title character of the 2003 book/2007 movie, Charlie Wilson’s War, passed away Feb. 10 of a heart attack.  He was 76 years old.

The Democratic representative from East Texas was one of Washington’s most colorful characters during his tenure.  Wilson was known best for two things:  First was his reputation as a playboy.  “Good Time Charlie” was seldom seen without a young lady on his arm possessive of most of the attributes prized by the superficial male.

Second, and infinitely more significant, was Wilson’s role in the covert effort to support rebel factions in Afghanistan fight against the Soviet army in the 1980s.

Charlie Wilson’s Role & Regrets

From Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990 , introductory essay by Steve Galster:

In 1984, Wilson used his powerful position on the House Intelligence Committee to tack on an additional $50 million for Afghan covert aid and convinced the CIA to purchase high-quality, Swiss-designed Oerlikon anti-aircraft missiles, which could pierce the heavy armor of the USSR’s most formidable counterinsurgency machine, the Hind Mi-24 helicopter. The CIA went even further in 1985, purchasing the sophisticated British-made Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles. And in 1986, due to pressure from several congressmen and a number of bureaucrats at the State and Defense departments, the CIA provided the mujahidin with U.S.-made Stinger missiles, the most effective shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapon in the world. It was the first time the CIA had provided U.S.-made weaponry as part of a covert insurgency support operation, and the legislative branch was largely responsible…

Wilson was the toast of Washington following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.  His efforts in support of the Afghan mujahidin, however, would have tragic unforeseen consequences.  Wilson, himself, admitted as much in 2003 National Public Radio interview.

“I take my full share of the blame, but – and at the time I didn’t realize how serious it was, but the United States, once the Communist government had fallen, once the Russians had left, we sort of lost interest, the United States and other Western countries,”  Wilson lamented to NPR’s Terry Gross.  “And because of that, we created a vacuum.”

Supporting Pakistani interests in fight against Communism

That a power vacuum existed in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent American neglect is true but only partially so.  What Wilson failed to mention was that in pursuit of America’s Cold War “triumph,” by allowing Pakistani intelligence (ISI) officials to distribute the American resources, that outcome was a foregone conclusion.

Melissa Roddy noted the consequences of allowing the ISI to select the beneficiaries of “American largesse” in a Dec. 2007 Alternet.org post.  Within it, Roddy scolds the filmmakers behind Charlie Wilson’s War for misrepresenting this historical aspect, particularly their failure to mention the substantial support– up to 40 percent of billions of dollars worth of American aid — given to “…a blood-thirsty, fundamentalist, loudly anti-American bastard named Gulbaddin Hekmatyar.”

Not only is Hekmatyar anti-American, but he and another anti-American fundamentalist, Abdul Rasul Sayaf, received lots of support during the 1980s from the Saudis. That support included cash and thousands of Arab volunteers, including a wealthy young engineer named Osama bin Laden. It was Hekmatyar and Sayaf who, with bin Laden, established terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why after 9/11, Wilson went on Fox News and said, “This was as much my fault as anybody’s.” He understood the link between U.S. support for these thugs and the events of that terrible day. But Wilson’s mea culpa is not included in Charlie Wilson’s War, nor is there any mention of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rasul Sayaf or Arab volunteers.

Upon the news of Wilson’s death, Roddy – a documentary filmmaker with a focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, past and present – published a post at ThePublicRecord.org entitled, “I Come Not to Praise Charlie Wilson, But to Bury Him.”  Her more recent condemnation pertains to the less romantic aspects of Wilson’s tireless efforts; namely, the Congressman’s ties to oil companies with regional interests and his lucrative, post-legislative career as a lobbyist for Pakistan.

Be sure to view the clip from Roddy’s documentary on the subject at the bottom of this post.  However, I’m less interested in the condemnation of Wilson than I am the Cold War mindset that facilitated him.

The destructive persistence of America’s Cold War Ethos

Historian H.W. Brands described the evolution of the American Cold War ethos in his 1993 book, “The Devil We Knew:  Americans and the Cold War.”

Within the book (and it should be noted that this pertains to a minuscule segment of Brand’s sweeping Cold War treatment) the author describes how the good vs. evil dichotomy became entrenched in American politics, foreign and domestic.  It was a black and white caricature of a gray-scale conflict, easily digestible for the American electorate.  Perhaps necessary at the time, it allowed Americans to collectively pat themselves on the back for “winning” the Cold War while ignoring the consequences, here described in the above linked National Security Archive essay from Galster:

Six thousand miles away from the celebrations, however, the war in Afghanistan raged on. Washington and Moscow’s clients, using U.S. and Soviet-supplied weapons, continued their internecine struggle for power, adding more civilian casualties to the 1 million who had already died. Although peace had broken out between the superpowers, the legacy of their long and bitter rivalry lived on in the rocket-prone city of Kabul, Pakistan’s crowded refugee camps and the war-ravaged villages in the Hindu Kush mountains.

Similarly, American ignorance of these conditions allowed for simplistic notions of the Cold War to persist in domestic politics.  “Few American voters cared to take the time to educate themselves to the nuances of the possible positions candidates might adopt on issues relating to national security,” Brands wrote.  “For the majority who didn’t, the question of whether an individual was reassuringly hard or suspiciously soft on communism simplified the sorting process.”

Also on the domestic front, this paradigm was exploited by “persons and organizations that had hidden behind the Cold War to oppose social reform…”  Brands notes that these constituencies would have no problem finding another mechanism following the Soviet Union’s collapse, however, “… red-baiting would be hard to match for its capacity to change the subject, and to throw advocates of reform on the defensive.”

There can be no doubt that these Cold War tendencies continue to poison America’s political climate.  The success of Charlie Wilson’s War at the box office is evidence that Americans were, and continue to be, willing to cling to their romantic notions well after the supposed Cold War’s end.

Replace communism with terrorism, the Soviet Union with Al Qaeda, in many of the above paragraphs and the extension of American Cold War sensibilities into the present becomes plain.  To be sure, the death of Charlie Wilson will do nothing to change this state of affairs.  Absent an American awakening to nuance in understanding U.S. foreign and domestic policy, it’s a shame that that we can’t bury the Cold War ethos with him.

See Also:

• Bob Mondello, “’Charlie Wilson’s War’ a Satirical Spin on History.” National Public Radio.  21 December 2007.
• Robert G. Anderson & George Crile, “Charlie Did It.”  60 Minutes Video, CBS News.  Aired 13 March 2001.
• Watch Part One of Melissa Roddy’s Conflict of Interest:  Patterns in Chaos.  (Part 2, Part 3)

by:  H.P. Alberelli and Jeffrey Kaye :

On Tuesday, February 10, the British High Court finally releaseda “seven-paragraph court document showing that MI5 officers were involved in the ill-treatment of a British resident, Binyam Mohamed.” The document is itself a summary of 42 classified CIA documents given to the British in 2002.

[snip]

The revelations regarding Mohamed’s torture, which include documentation of the fact the US conducted “continuous sleep deprivation” under threats ofharm, rendition, or being “disappeared,” were criticized by the British court as being “at the very least cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by the United States authorities,” and in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Torture.

The Mohamed case is the most prominent of a number of cases that have come to public attention. While the timeline of Mohamed’s torture places the implementation of the Bush administration’s so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” many months prior to their questionable legal justification in the August 1, 2002, Jay Bybee memo to the CIA, the use of torture and rendition has a much earlier provenance…

[snip]

Read the compelling report @ truthout–> The Real Roots of the CIA’s Rendition and Black Sites Program – 17 February 2010

Evidence of torture, new and old, has landed President Obama in a bit of a quandary.  A significant percentage of his supporters are calling for criminal prosecution of Bush officials responsible for apparent war crimes.  Meanwhile, the President’s detractors pose numerous counter arguments, recommending against investigating the Bush Administration’s torture policy.  Barack Obama is in a tight spot, and his impetus to “look forward, not back” is understandable considering the antagonistic state of political affairs in America.  However, as unpleasant as investigations and prosecutions will be domestically, external perspectives need to be considered.

Perhaps the most important foreign perspective worth considering is that of our enemy:  Al Qaeda.  How is the argument over torture within the U.S. perceived by Osama Bin Ladin ?  More importantly, how does it impact their recruiting capacity?  To a certain extent, we already know the answers.

One extremely informed opinion was published at The Daily Beast last week.  Writing under the pseudonym, Matthew Alexander, a 14 year Air Force interrogator offered his assessment in a April 20 post.  Responding to Christopher Buckley’s and Michael Mukasey’s criticisms of Obama for releasing the previously classified Office of Legal Council torture memos, Alexander wrote:

Our policy of torture and abuse of prisoners has been Al Qaida’s number one recruiting tool, a point that Buckley does not mention and is also conspicuously absent from former CIA Director General Michael Hayden and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s argument in the Wall Street Journal. As the senior interrogator in Iraq for a task force charged with hunting down Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the former Al Qaida leader and mass murderer, I listened time and time again to captured foreign fighters cite the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo as their main reason for coming to Iraq to fight. Consider that 90 percent of the suicide bombers in Iraq are these foreign fighters and you can easily conclude that we have lost hundreds, if not thousands, of American lives because of our policy of torture and abuse…

In addition to increasing Al Qaeda’s pool of recruits, the torturing of detainees has undoubtedly led counter terrorism officials to waste time and resources chasing invented threats.  Former Middle East CIA field officer, Robert Baer noted in the May 4 print issue of Time that the Bush Administration selected their techniques from a 1957 paper regarding communist efforts during the Korean War:

The Crucial point, though, is that even the communists suspected that torture can’t be relied on to produce more than false confessions — because people will say anything to make the pain stop.  This is the history that Bush officials chose to ignore…

I’d love to know what you think.  If you’re able, set aside the moral and legal implications of the Bush Administration’s treatment of captured enemy combatants.  Then consider the implications of the above informed commentators, Alexander and Baer; respectively, that torturing our prisoners makes it easier for our enemies to recruit, and that waterboading, specifically, is more likely than not to produce false information from a prisoner.  These tactics, then, are quite contradictory to the maintenance of U.S. national security.

(Originally posted at Care2.com, Political Causes Blog 28 April 2009)

From The Public Record by Melvin A. Goodman, 9 July 2009:

“Let me be clear about this,” CIA director Leon Panetta told his troops in May, “it was not CIA policy or practice to mislead Congress. That is against our laws and our values.”

Of course, Panetta is entitled to his opinions, but he cannot create his own facts. And, as a long-time member of the House of Representatives, he surely must know that there is a long and substantiated record of CIA deceit and dissembling to the congressional intelligence committees, which lawmakers revealed late Wednesday Panetta admitted to in a closed-door briefing. Here are some highlights of the CIA’s record of lying to Congress…  Read More

This was originally published @ Care2.com:

Former Vice President, Dick Cheney, was at it again last Sunday.  He adamantly vocalized his disapproval of President Obama’s national security policy, and was incredulous about the idea that Bush Administration officials should be investigated for their treatment of enemy combatants.  Of course, Cheney has every right to voice his opinion in these matters, though such criticism from a former VP is highly unusual.  However, considering the Bush Administration’s past behavior in politicizing traditionally non-political government entities, how are the claims of Dick Cheney, in any way, credible?

On last Sunday’s Face the Nation, one of Cheney’s statements deserved more scrutiny than the 30 min. program allowed:

One of the things that I did six weeks ago was I made a request that two memos that I personally know of, written by the CIA, that lay out the successes of those policies and point out in considerable detail all of — all that we were able to achieve by virtue of those policies, that those memos be released, be made public.

First of all, the “two memos… that lay out the successes of those policies,” couldn’t possibly discount that torturing detainees enhanced the ability of terrorists to recruit new supporters.  So, even if the memos in question reveal productive results, those results were, at best, a push when considering the policy’s impact on US national security.

Second, and more importantly, how can two memos vindicate policies that were in clear violation of prescriptions within the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention Against Torture?  Jeremy Scahill summed up why the policies can’t be excused, particularly as they apply to the latter, “This is a matter of law and US obligations to its international treaties, which the Constitution explicitly states the US will respect and enforce.”  The memos, even if they support what Cheney suggests, are illustrative of a policy that was blatantly illegal.

Finally, consider the behavior of Dick Cheney and others in the run up to the Iraq invasion.  There is a pattern of deceptive practices by Bush officials in shaping policies and intelligence to fit their goals.  The Office of Special Plans (OSP) is an instructive example.  Jason Leopold, presently of ThePublicRecord.org, reported for Truthout.org in 2007:

The Office of Special Plans routinely provided President Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Condoleezza Rice, who headed the National Security Council at the time, with questionable intelligence information on the Iraqi threat. Much of that information was included in various speeches by Bush and Cheney, and some was never vetted for accuracy by career CIA analysts…

…Patrick Lang, a former director of Middle East analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in an interview with the New Yorker in May 2003 that the Office of Special Plans “started picking out things that supported their thesis and stringing them into arguments that they could use with the president. It’s not intelligence. It’s political propaganda.”

The OSP was developed by Donald Rumsfeld out of frustration regarding the lack of actionable intelligence on Iraq’s capabilities and intentions.  Headed by Douglas Feith — whom Gen. Tommy Franks once referred to as the “Dumbest MF’er on the planet” — the OSP did not gather new intelligence.  Rather, the Department of Defense office reinterpreted existing data, cherry-picking and restating evidence to support the invasion of Iraq.  When Dick Cheney insists upon a link between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein, the OSP is the source of his evidence.  Of course, we now know there was no such link.

This is merely one example, but when considered along with Cheney’s insistence that waterboarding “worked” and “kept us safe,” how can he be taken seriously?  Let me know what you think.

Personally, I wouldn’t put it past Cheney to contort evidence to fit his narrative.  It is entirely plausible that, in calling for the release of the two CIA memos, the former Vice President is cherry-picking evidence just as he did before the invasion of Iraq.  Further, it is more than plausible, as was indicated today by FBI agent, Ali Soufan, in his testimony before Congress that the interrogation methods DO NOT WORK.  Soufan said the harsh techniques were “ineffective, slow and unreliable and as a result, harmful to our efforts to defeat al-Qaida.”:

[vodpod id=Groupvideo.2651108&w=425&h=350&fv=%26rel%3D0%26border%3D0%26]

When the past actions of Dick Cheney are considered along with his present public statements, it is entirely possible that torture was employed, not to discover a link between Al Qaida and Iraq, but to create one.